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. Introduction

Private citizens frequently sue law enforcement agencies and the
governmental bodies to which they answer.' Often, plaintiffs accuse police
officers of violating their civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 1983.2 With over 215

million private citizens reporting annual face-to-face contact with one of the
nearly one million full-time law enforcement employees, problems are certain

to occur Plaintiffs file suits against departments of all sizes, from New York
City4 to Tuscaloosa, Alabama.' The city of Oakland, California, recently paid
1. See King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that "lawsuits
against local law enforcement officers occur with sufficient frequency inthis district... that the
test specifically tailored to resolving the discovery disputes in those cases needs repeating").
2. See Martin A. Schwartz, Admissibility of lnvestigatoryReports in § 1983 CivilRights
Actions-A User's Manual, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 453, 459 (1996) ("Large numbers of§ 1983
actions arise out of encounters with law enforcement officers.").
3. See ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES (120th ed. 2000) (Table No. 352, Table No. 354) (displaying number of police

and number of citizens reporting face-to-face encounter with police).
4. See, e.g., Banks v. Yokemick, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing
settlement of $750,001 against city and judgment of $650,001 against an individual officer).
The plaintiff brought suit when her son died as a result of being knocked from his bike after a
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$10.9 million to settle claims brought by over 100 plaintiffs based on the
actions of four rogue police officers.6 One county in Maryland paid over $7.9
million in jury awards and out-of-court settlements in lawsuits alleging police
misconduct between July 2000 and January 2003.7
These lawsuits serve as external checking mechanisms by encouraging
police departments to act within the bounds of the law or face the consequences
of illegal behavior in a civil suit.8 Law enforcement agencies also engage in
self-policing through internal affairs investigations, detailed personnel files, and
studies regarding police procedures. 9 This Note analyzes the competing
interests that a court must balance when these checking mechanisms conflict.
When individuals sue a law enforcement agency, they often seek discovery of
an agency's self-evaluative documents.' 0 In response, agencies typically assert
numerous privileges in an attempt to protect these documents from discovery."
The self-critical analysis privilege is one such privilege.
The self-critical analysis privilege protects self-evaluative materials from
discovery when the public interest in preserving the internal evaluations of
organizations outweighs a plaintiffis right to the evidence. 2 Courts recognize
that organizations may be less likely to engage in self-policing, and in addition
may compile less reliable information when doing so, if plaintiffs can access
the results of these self-analyses. 3 This Note analyzes the foundations of the
pursuing officer threw his radio and struck the decedent in the head. Id. at 243-44.
5. See, e.g., Stephanie Taylor, Inmate Says He Was Beaten, TUSCALOOSA NEWs, Feb. 1,
2003, at AI (detailing alleged abuse by correction's officer and possible suit against city).
6. See Janine DeFao, "Rider's"Victims Unmollified,S.F. CHRoN., Feb. 23, 2003, at A] 7
(detailing settlement and procedures implemented to prevent further abuses).
7. See Ruben Castaneda, Police Abuse Suits Cost Pr. George's $7.9 Million, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at A I (detailing disclosure by county executive).
8. See, e.g., Boyd v. Gullett, 64 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Md. 1974) ("The plaintiffs have
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1986 and 1988, seeking both declaratory
and injunctive relief to force the supervisory personnel to establish effective rules and
procedures to prevent police brutality and to force the police officers ... to refrain from further
illegal acts.").
9. See, e.g., Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45, 46 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (describing police
chief resisting disclosure of "personnel investigative reports on the grounds that such discovery
would impair his ability to obtain the internal reporting necessary to provide for an efficient
police force").
10. See, e.g., Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(noting that plaintiff seeks discovery of performance evaluations, discipline logs, internal
investigation and an investigatory file).
11. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing overlapping privileges available to law enforcement
agencies).
12. See infra Part 1l.A (providing a more complete definition of the privilege).
13. See infra Part IV.A. l (discussing the chilling effect of disclosure).
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self-critical analysis privilege as applied to claims brought against law
enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies are in a unique position to
assert a privilege based on the public good because they are duty-bound to act
in the public interest. Assertion of this privilege in the law enforcement context
provides stark examples of the competing public policies underlying both the
validation and rejection of the self-critical analysis privilege.
Part II of this Note provides a definition of the privilege and distinguishes
it from closely related privileges available to law enforcement agencies.14 Part
III provides a history of the privilege in order to highlight the uncertain status
of the privilege as well as to provide a perspective for the following policy
discussion.' 5 Part IV analyzes the competing factors that courts must weigh
when deciding whether to recognize an assertion of the privilege by law
enforcement agencies. 16 Part V discusses two hypothetical assertions of the
privilege in order to provide concrete examples of both factor-balancing and
inconsistencies in the privilege's application."
II. Definition andDistinction
A. Definition
Courts employ the self-critical analysis privilege to protect documents
from discovery when "public policy outweighs the needs of litigants and the
judicial system for access to information relevant to litigation."' 8 As most
courts employ it, the privilege consists of three criteria, but may include up to
five criteria.' 9 First, the documents must consist of self-evaluative materials
undertaken by the asserting party.' ° Law enforcement agencies invoke the
privilege attempting to protect such documents as personnel files,2' internal
14. See infra Part II (providing definition and distinction from other privileges).
15. See infra Part III (discussing history of privilege).
16. See infra Part IV (analyzing factors favoring protection and those favoring
disclosure).
17. See infra Part V (analyzing hypotheticals).
18. Melhom v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. 98-CV-6687, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6320, at *3 (D.N.J. May 15, 2001).
19. See Clark v. Pa. Power& Light Co., No. 98-3017,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5118, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1999) (stating that privilege generally has three requirements).

20. See id. ("The materials must have been prepared for mandatory government reports, or
for a self-critical analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection.").
21. See Scouler v. Craig, 116 F.R.D. 494,495 (D.N.J. 1987) (granting motion to compel
release of personnel files in part after in camera inspection).
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investigation files concerning police officers' conduct, 22 transcripts of review
24
committee meetings, 23 evaluations of internal affairs divisions' effectiveness,
reports regarding health care provided to inmates, 25 and task force reports of

informants' activities.* 26
Second, the privilege generally protects only the subjective aspects of the
documents, not the underlying factual basis. 27 Courts often order an in camera

review of the documents to determine the factual or subjective nature of the
documents. 28 According to one court, in camera supervision of discovery "may
22. See Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(granting motion to squash subpoena duces tecum concerning a "District Attorney's special
investigations file"); Torres v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp 1201, 1214 (D.N.J. 1996) (denying
motion to protect factual aspects of internal investigation report).
23. See Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1061-62 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (noting
value of "self-critical efforts," but ordering disclosure due to exceptional need).
24. See Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (balancing
plaintiff's need for discovery against chilling effect on department's self-examination).
25. See Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 34-35 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)
(finding that defendants had failed to prove that releasing reports concerning prison health care
would curtail flow of information).
26. See Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413,417 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding privilege had
been waived by voluntary disclosure and did not apply to task force report).
27. See Clark v. Pa. Power& Light Co., No. 98-3017,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5118, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1999) (noting that privilege "extends only to subjective, evaluative materials,
but not to objective data in the reports"); Paul A. Weiss, Who's Watching the Watchdog?: SelfEvaluative PrivilegeandJournalisticResponsibilityin Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 7 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149, 153 (noting that "most important" limitation of the privilege "is the rule
that the SEP [self-evaluative privilege] does not extend to factual materials"). Butsee Robert J.
Bush, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation-The Corporate Self-Evaluative
Privilege: ParadigmaticPreferentialismor PragmaticPanacea,87 Nw. U. L. REv. 597,609
(1993) (noting that limiting privilege's protection to opinion "ignores the fact that informed,
sound legal decision-making depends entirely upon accurate factual information"); Note, The
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1100 (1983) [hereinafter SelfCriticalAnalysis] (concluding that courts should "recognize all of the various ways in which
self-analysis may be chilled, and protect factual portions of self-analyses that meet the
privilege's criteria").
28. See Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 27-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(protecting intradepartmental memoranda submitted for in camera review); Troupin v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ordering in camera inspection for
determining "which portions of [report regarding diversity planning by defendant and results of
employee survey] constitute discoverable facts, and which constitute narrative, evaluative or
analytical materials protected by the Privilege"); see also Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.R.D.
270, 273 (N.D. I11. 2000) (protecting safety reports and noting that after in camerareview court
found reports irrelevant). But see Clark, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5118, at *2-3 (ordering
disclosure of"those portions of the affirmative action plans containing factual information (as
distinguished from evaluative or analytical information)" but making no mention of in camera
review and apparently leaving the matter to the party's discretion); Note, The Self-Critical
Analysis Privilege and Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L.
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be necessary to protect the decision-making process in the various government

agencies" even though "[m]aterial of a non-factual nature, i.e., official
criticisms, recommendations of action, policy recommendations or opinions of
supervisory personnel... could well be relevant to the plaintiffs' case. ' 29 Even
after an in camera evaluation, the distinction between facts and subjective
conclusions presents a difficult line to draw.3 °
Third, the defendant must demonstrate clearly that the factors favoring
protection outweigh the policies favoring disclosure. 3' As a corollary of the
third element, some courts require that the party invoking the privilege show
that the processes producing the information "would be curtailed if discovery is
allowed."3 2 Courts recognize that law enforcement agencies may lose valuable
constructive criticism if participants fear public disclosure of their
deliberations.33 Determining when the threat of disclosure would curtail the
process requires a fact-specific inquiry.34
REV. 405,417 (1984) [hereinafter Self-CriticalAnalysis Privilege] (noting that "[s]ome courts
have allowed the employer to remove the self-criticism without court inspection").
29. See Boyd v. Gullett, 64 F.R.D. 169, 178 (D. Md. 1974) (refusing to recognize
"general privilege against discovery of police files"). But see Hampton v. City of San Diego,
147 F.R.D. 227, 229-30 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (noting discovery dispute regarding personnel files
and internal affairs documents should be handled by parties because "[i]t iscertainly not fair to
the taxpayers to have to pay the costs and expenditures of the federal courts for work that
attorneys should be doing"); Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 108-09 (1986) (stating that
"information may be so highly confidential that its disclosure to anyone, including ajudge, will
irreparably hamper an agency's procedures").
30.

See James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a GeneralPrivilegefor Setf-CriticalAnalyses, 51

GEO. WASH. L. REv. 551, 557 (1983) (noting that distinction is "necessarily blurred" and
suggesting that "only obviously subjective and conclusory material is protected"); see also SelfCriticalAnalysis Privilege, supra note 28, at 417 (noting that affirmative action plans are "a
blend of statistics and prose, often with no clear lines between self-evaluation and fact").
31. See Clark, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5118, at *5-6 ("The policy favoring exclusion must
clearly outweigh plaintiffs need for the documents.").
32. Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see Brunt v.
Hunterdon County, 183 F.R.D. 181, 186 (D.N.J. 1998) (using identical language (citing Torres
v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp. 1201, 1214-15 (D.N.J. 1996))).
33. See Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) ("It is not
realistic to expect candid expressions of opinion or suggestions as to future policy or procedures
in an air of apprehension that such statements may well be used against one's colleague or
employer in a subsequent litigated matter."). The goal of self improvement is lost "if the input is
not reliable." Id. "It is clear that the reliability of the input inthis situation varies inversely with
the risk of disclosure of the input or resulting criticisms." Id.
34. See Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379,387 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(denying motion to compel "reports produced for Lockheed's Diversity Council relating to the
company's work culture.., because.., frank assessments contained in the reports as such
evaluations would almost certainly be curtailed if discovery were allowed" but granting motion
to compel other documents at issue because "any chilling effect would be de minimis since the
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Many courts add a fourth element that requires a party asserting the
privilege to prove that the documents were prepared with the expectation of
confidentiality and that they were, in fact, kept confidential.35 This
confidentiality requirement applies to virtually any privilege.36 Disclosure to an
unnecessary third party waives the privilege because the law concerning the
self-critical analysis privilege tracks the law concerning other privileges in this
regard.3 7 Whether voluntary disclosure to a federal agency constitutes waiver is
one example of how the law of self-critical analysis privilege mirrors the debate
regarding the attorney-client privilege.38
Following another general privilege rule, courts do not recognize assertion
of the self-critical analysis privilege if it is asserted in furtherance of a crime or
fraud. 39 As in situations involving waiver, jurisprudence regarding other
documents are mandated by law").
35. See, e.g., Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423,426 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
this "general proviso" in discussion of self-critical analysis privilege); see also Stephen C.
Simpson, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege in Employment Law, 21 J. CORP. L. 577, 595
(1996) (noting that "[t]o be privileged, documents generally must be prepared with the
expectation and understanding that they will remain confidential").
36. See Morgan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 182 F.R.D. 261, 266 (N.D. I11.1998) ("Like
every other privilege, confidentiality is an essential element of the self-critical analysis
privilege."); see also 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (4th ed. 1961) (stating that "four
fundamental conditions" of proposed privilege should include "(1) [t]he communications must
originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed [and] (2) [t]his element of
confidentialitymust be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties").
37. See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 552 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that
"[w]e need not decide, however, whether the district court's order denying pretrial discovery of
defendants' self-critical evaluations was proper in this case [because] [t]he voluntary use by
defendants at trial of their affirmative action efforts to prove nondiscrimination opened the door
and waived whatever qualified privilege may have existed"); see also David P. Leonard,
Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 115 (1988)
(proposing model legislation for codifying privilege); John F. X. Peloso, The Privilegefor SelfCritical Analysis: Protecting the Public by Protecting the Confidentiality of Internal
Investigations in the Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG. L. J. 229, 242 (1990) (noting that few
courts have "discussed waiver of the self-evaluation privilege by an organization" but noting
that "decisions concerning the attorney-client privilege are instructive").
38. See Bush, supra note 27, at 611 (noting that "this is the most disturbing development
in the emerging SEP [self-evaluative privilege] doctrine because voluntary disclosure to
regulatory agencies (i.e., voluntary compliance) represents the very foundation of the
privilege"). Bush notes that although waiver "is completely counterproductive ... [f]ortunately,
this waiver doctrine does not mean what it purports to say." Id. Courts are likely to apply a
limited waiver "to prevent private litigants and other agencies from gaining access to such
voluntarily disclosed self-evaluative information." Id. at 612.
39. See Leonard, supra note 37, at 147-48 (discussing crime or fraud exception to
proposed codification of privilege); see also Brad Bacon, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis: EncouragingRecognition of the MisunderstoodPrivilege,8 KAN. J. L. &PUB. POL'Y
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privileges, particularly the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine, should "guide courts" in the proper application of the crime or fraud
exception. One commentator notes that courts may use a higher standard and
not recognize assertion of the privilege by parties acting in bad faith. 41 This
higher standard is reasonable given that the party asserting the self-critical
analysis privilege does so on a public policy basis. 2
B. Distinction
1. Synonyms
Consistent with the practice of most courts and commentators, this Note
uses the term "self-critical analysis privilege" to describe the privilege. 43 It is
worth noting that courts refer to the privilege by many other names: "selfevaluative privilege," 44 "self-evaluation privilege, 45 "critical self-analysis
privilege, 4 6 "self-examination privilege, 4 7 "self-policing privilege," 4' and
221, 227 (1999) (noting that versions of self-critical analysis privilege enacted by state
legislatures incorporate common exceptions to privileges including "loss of the privilege if it is
asserted for purposes of fraud").
40. Leonard, supra note 37, at 147-48.
41. See Peloso, supra note 37, at 241 (noting that courts have not respected assertion of
privilege "if the organization has acted fraudulently or in bad faith").
42. See Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentialityof
Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355, 357 (1987) (noting corporation's

"manipulation of the privilege should not be allowed to hamper the grand jury process...
[because] it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the privilege").
43. See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. l:98-CV-3679-RWS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21025, at *18 n.2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2000) (noting that "[ajlthough this privilege is sometimes
referred to by other names, 'self-critical analysis' isthe most common"); Peloso, supra note 37,
at 234 (noting that privilege isreferred to "by courts and commentators as a qualified privilege
for self-evaluation or, more commonly, the privilege for self-critical analysis").
44. See Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 100 (D.N.J. 1989) (recognizing that "selfevaluative privilege, sometimes known as the self-critical analysis privilege ...exists as a
matter of both New Jersey and federal common law").
45. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 214 F.3d 586,
593 n.20 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[tjhe self-evaluation privilege isalso known as the 'selfcritical analysis' privilege and the 'self-evaluative' privilege").
46. See Melhorn v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. 98-CV-6687, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6320, at *3 (D.N.J. May 15, 2001) (noting that "court has employed the 'critical selfanalysis' privilege where public policy outweighs the needs of litigants and the judicial system
for access to information").
47. See Rosario v. N.Y. Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that
privilege "exists to permit free discussion looking toward compliance with law").
48. See Mason v.Stock, 869 F.Supp. 828,834 (D.Kan. 1994) (noting privilege is akin to
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"self-criticism privilege. ' 4 9 Adopted by numerous states, a "statutory
environmental audit privilege" is a situation-specific application of the
privilege. 50 And at least one court has recognized a "special officer's privilege"
in the context of a securities investigation and litigation which mirrored the
self-critical analysis privilege. 51
The peer review privilege can be understood as a sister privilege of the
self-critical analysis privilege.5 2 The peer review privilege, which many states
have codified, 3 protects medical committee reviews of patient care by
guaranteeing the confidentiality of the proceedings.5 4 The self-critical analysis
privilege is perhaps best viewed as "a more broadly focused, or generalized,
variant of peer review."" Courts first recognized the self-critical analysis
privilege in the medical peer review context, 56 but now recognize it in a wide
variety of circumstances. 57

self-critical analysis privilege).
49.

See S. Kay McNab, Criticizingthe Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL L. REv. 675,

675 (analyzing "self-criticism privilege in light of the traditional rationales of privacy and social
policy that justify existing privileges").
50. See Phillip Leahy, The Privilegefor Self-Critical Analysis in Statutory and Common
Law, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L.& POL'Y 49, 49 (1998) (noting that over twenty states have adopted

privilege, which "has its beginning inthe common law privilege for self-critical analysis").
51. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (protecting special
investigative counsel's report because "it is likely that corporations will be less willing to
engage in this sort of self-investigation if the results of such an investigation can be discovered
inparallel civil litigation"); see also Nancy C. Crisman & Arthur F. Mathews, Limited Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilegeand Work-ProductDoctrine in InternalCorporateInvestigations: An
Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative"Privilege,21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 153 (1983) (noting

that court in LTV "fashioned a privilege that resembled a combination of all the privileges
available to the government agency and the corporation encompassing attorney-client privilege,
work-product protection, and executive branch investigatory confidentiality").
52. See Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys., No. C-3-99-612,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20046, at
*22 n.12 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2002) (noting that "the two concepts stem from the same trunk").
53. See, e.g., ARuz. REv. STAT. § 36-445 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 425.1 (West
2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West 2002).
54. See Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (noting
that "[w]ithout the protection afforded through the confidentiality of the proceedings, the ability
of the [medical] profession to police itself effectively would be severely compromised").
55.
56.

Id.
See infra Part II.A (discussing privilege's origin in Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50

F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970)).
57. See Peloso, supra note 37, at 236 (stating that "principles of Bredice have been
applied in a variety of contexts where disclosure of the requested reports might have inhibited
future organizational self-analysis").

60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2003)
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2. OverlappingPrivilegesAvailable to Law Enforcement
In addition to the varying names by which parties refer to the privilege,
closely related yet distinct privileges aggravate the confusion surrounding the
self-critical analysis privilege. 8 While these privileges may protect some of the
same information, and in this sense are overlapping, the self-critical analysis
privilege is unique in the breadth of its coverage.5 9 Parties often assert
numerous privileges in an attempt to protect the same documents. 60 The
following subsections provide a brief summary of the three most significant
overlapping privileges.6
a. Executive Privilege
Much like the self-critical analysis privilege, the executive privilege
protects information that "the disclosure of which would be contrary to the
public interest. 6 2 Like the self-critical analysis privilege, the executive
privilege is called by other names 63 and often is invoked and analyzed in

58. See Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp 1063, 1066 (D. Colo. 1990) (stating that various
names attached to privileges, such as state secrets privilege, executive privilege, deliberative
process privilege, self-critical analysis privilege, and official information privilege "prevent the
disclosure of information whose disclosure would be contrary to the public interest"); SelfCriticalAnalysis, supra note 27, at 1088 (noting that in context of discovery disputes over
police department investigations, "the self-critical analysis privilege and the executive privilege
overlap" and so "courts should therefore look to both doctrines for guidance in this area").
59. See infra notes 67-68, 73-76, 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing breadth of
self-critical analysis privilege as compared to executive privilege, deliberative process privilege,
and law enforcement investigatory privileges); see also Stuart E. Rickerson, 68 DEF. COUNS. J.
474, 474 (200 1)(book review) (noting that self-critical analysis privilege is "the broadest of all
privileges generally available to corporations").
60. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 228 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
(noting that defendants had claimed "the self-critical analysis privilege, the official information
privilege and the executive privilege"); Boyd v. City of New York, No. 86 Civ. 4501-CSH,
1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1987) (invoking self-critical analysis and
executive privileges to protect human resources report in investigation of police officer
conduct).
61. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing executive privilege, deliberative process privilege,
and law enforcement investigatory privilege).
62. Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 296 (D.Idaho 1983).
63. See Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, No. 96-1249-F6T, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13779, at
*2 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 1997) (stating that "deliberative process privilege [is] also known as the
executive privilege"); Torres v. Kuzniasz, 936 F.Supp 1201, 1209 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating that
law enforcement privilege is "sometimes referred to as an 'executive' privilege or 'official
information' privilege").
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precisely the same manner as the self-critical analysis privilege.64 Analysis of
the executive privilege is relevant to a discussion of the self-critical analysis
privilege. 65 The self-critical analysis privilege, the deliberative process
privilege, and the law enforcement investigatory privilege are narrow
applications of the executive privilege.66 However, a valid assertion of the
executive privilege requires action by the head of a department. 67 The selfcritical analysis privilege contains no such limitation and in this sense is more
expansive than the executive privilege.68
b. DeliberativeProcessPrivilege
The deliberative process privilege69 is closely related to the self-critical analysis
privilege. 70 One commentator labeled the self-critical analysis privilege and the
64. See Elliot, 98 F.R.D. at 296-98 (protecting evaluative material inpersonnel files after
assertion that revealing information would have adverse effect on department's ability to
conduct evaluations); see also Case Comment, Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports-A
Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 57 MINN. L. REv. 807, 814 (1973) [hereinafter SelfEvaluative Reports] (noting that "'qualified privilege' for confidential self-evaluations...
resembles the executive privilege and supports a similar policy of preserving the free flow of
communication vital to an important public interest").
65. See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974), in discussion of the self-critical analysis
privilege); Flanagan, supra note 30, at 551 (same).
66. See Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
"executive privilege is the government's privilege to prevent disclosure of certain information
whose disclosure would be contrary to the public interest" while the policy behind the selfcritical analysis privilege is "to assure that subordinates within an agency will feel free to
provide the decision maker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations"); see also
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d. 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that deliberative process and
law enforcement privileges are qualified, common law executive privileges); Vons Co. v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 22 (2001) (noting that "the Supreme Court recognized that within the
scope of the executive privilege exists a deliberative process privilege").
67. See Landry, 204 F.3d. at 1135 (noting that privilege requires "a formal claim of
privilege by the 'head of the department' having control over the requested information [and]
assertion of the privilege based on actual personal consideration by that official").
68. See supra Part I.A (discussing four common elements of self-critical analysis
privilege).
69. See Hopkins v. United States Dep't ofHous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir.
1991) (stating that requirements of privilege are "[f]irst, the document must be predecisional,
that is, prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision [and]
[s]econd the documents must be deliberative, that is, actually. . . related to the process by which
policies are formulated" (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
70. See Morrissey v. City of New York, 171 F.R.D. 85, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that
self-critical analysis privilege's "contours seem to map the deliberative process privilege");
Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, No. 96-1249-F6T, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13779, at *2 (D. Kan.
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deliberative process privilege as "twin privileges."'" In arguing for greater recognition
of the self-critical analysis privilege, this commentator treated the "deliberative process
privilege [as] the government's version of private enterprise's self-critical analysis
privilege." 7 2 The deliberative process privilege contains two requirements not found in
the self-critical analysis privilege. First, the documents must be both predecisional and
deliberative, in that they must be prepared to assist an agency decisionmaker in
formulating policy.73 While evaluations protected by the self-critical analysis privilege
may result in change within the organization and in this sense are predecisional, this
possibility is not an explicit requirement for effective implementation of the
privilege.7 4 Second, the opinions protected by the self-critical analysis privilege are
broader in scope than the deliberations protected by the deliberative process
privilege. 71 While the two are admittedly closely related, the self-critical analysis
privilege can be applied in scenarios in which the deliberative process privilege
cannot.76

Aug. 27, 1997) (describing two privileges as "similar").
71. John Louis Kellogg, What's Goodfor the Goose. . Differential Treatment of the
DeliberativeProcess and Self-CriticalAnalysisPrivileges,52 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CONrEMP. L.
255, 257 (1997).
72. Id. at 262; see also John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and
CorporateComplianceAudits, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 621,634 n.57 (1995) (stating that "[t]he selfevaluative privilege looks like a private version of the deliberative privilege").
73. See Kellogg, supranote 71, at 266-67 (discussing elements of deliberative process
privilege).
74. See supra Part I.A (discussing four common elements of self-critical analysis
privilege).
75. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 612 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that while
two privileges are "closely related" deliberative process privilege "should be invoked only in the
context of communications designed to directly contribute to the formulation of important
public policy"); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)
(noting that self-critical analysis privilege protects "subjective analysis" and deliberative process
privilege only protects communications that are "deliberative in character"). But see Thompson
v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (analyzing "deliberative
privilege, or 'self-critical' analysis privilege" as same privilege).
76. See, e.g., Granger v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(protecting from discovery results of investigatory committee report).
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c. Law Enforcement Investigatory Privilege
The law enforcement investigatory privilege" allows police to conduct criminal
investigations without exposing the details of the manner in which the investigations
79

are carried out.7" The law enforcement privilege has been codified both federally

and by numerous states. ° Although both privileges involve a balancing of public
interests, 81 successful assertion of the self-critical analysis privilege protects more
information than the law enforcement privilege. The law enforcement privilege
requires the head of a department; after personal consideration, to invoke the privilege,
a procedural step not found in the self-critical analysis privilege.82

77. See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680,687 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(listing three requirements of privilege: "(1) the head of the department having control over the
documents must raise a formal claim of privilege; (2) the department head must assert the
privilege based on his or her actual personal consideration of the documents; and (3) the
claimant must make a detailed specification of the information" and "explain why this
information properly falls within the scope of the privilege").
78. See Tuite v. Henry, 98 F.3d 1411, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that privilege
'protects against the release of documents whose disclosure might reveal law enforcement
investigative techniques or sources"); Dep't of Investig. v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481,484 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating that "purpose of this privilege is to prevent disclosure of law enforcement
techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law
enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and
otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation").
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000) (codifying exception to Freedom of Information Act
protecting law enforcement information and records that meet one of six criteria).
80. See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW § 87(2)(e) (McKinney 2002) (providing
exception from state law requiring availability of public inspection and copying of documents
that are "compiled for law enforcement purposes" and that meet one of four criteria).
81. See Ostrowski v. Holem, No. 02-CJ-0281,2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 794, at *4 n. I (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 21, 2003) (listing factors to be considered when balancing assertion of law enforcement
privilege against plaintiff's need for information).
82. See In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that law
enforcement privilege requires "a formal claim of privilege by the head of the department...
based on actual personal consideration"); Ostrowski, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 794, at *6 (same).
But see Schwartz, supra note 2, at 513 (stating that "debate over existence of a critical selfevaluation privilege" is not of significance in discussion of admissibility of§ 1983 investigatory
reports because "the pertinent competing private and governmental interests are already
considered under the qualified privilege for investigatory materials").
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11Y. History of the Sef-CriticalAnalysisPrivilege

Courts and commentators agree that in Bredice v. DoctorsHospital,Inc.," the
District Court for the District of Columbia first established the self-critical analysis
privilege. 84 While at least one court has categorically denied its existence, 85 many
courts recognize the privilege and allow parties to employ it to protect sensitive
83. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970). In Bredice, the court
considered objections to a pretrial examiner's recommended denial of the motion for production
of certain documents relating to the death of a patient. Id. at 250. In furtherance of a
malpractice suit, the plaintiff sought to compel the "[m]inutes and reports of any Board or
Committee of Doctors Hospital or its staff concerning the death of Frank J.Bredice" as well as
other reports. Id. at 249-50. The court first considered that the minutes and reports of any
board or committee meeting were made "pursuant to the requirements ofthe Joint Commissions
on Accreditation of Hospitals." Id. at 250. The court then noted that the "Commission has said
that the 'sole objective' of such staff meetings is the 'improvement' in the available care and
treatment." Id. After noting that the committee work was performed with an expectation that all
communications were to be kept confidential, the court stated "[c]onfidentiality is essential to
effective functioning of these staff meetings; and these meetings are essential to the continued
improvement in the care and treatment of patients." Id. Allowing discovery of these
documents, "without a showing of exceptional necessity," would result in the end of these
beneficial critiques. Id. One final aspect of the documents that weighed against disclosure was
the fact that they were retrospective in nature and "not a part of current patient care." Id.
Finding "an overwhelming public interest in having those staff meetings held on a confidential
basis," the Bredice court overruled the objections brought on the recommendation not to
disclose. Id. at 251.
84. See Johnson v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 206 F.R.D. 686, 688 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(stating that "[tihe self-critical analysis privilege was first recognized inBredice"); Spencer Sav.
Bank v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting that "[t]he
privilege had its origin in Bredice"); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434, 1438 (D.
Kan. 1995) (noting that Bredice "is commonly referred to as the seminal case recognizing the
privilege"); Donald P. Vandegrift Jr., The Privilege ofSelf-Critical Analysis: A Survey of the

Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 171, 175 (1996) (citing Bredice as the first enunciation of "the principles
underlying the privilege"). At least one court has noted possible earlier origins. See Reichhold
Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (noting that prior to
Bredice former Fifth Circuit had provided "immunity from discovery" to "retrospective accident
investigations" and finding no grounds upon which "to distinguish it [the immunity] from the
self-critical analysis privilege" (citing S. Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 130-33 (5th Cir.
1968))); Richards v.Me. Cent. R.R., 21 F.R.D. 590, 591-92 (D. Me. 1957) (applying similar
privilege without calling it "self-critical analysis"); see also Charles S.McCowan Jr. & L. Victor
Gregoire, The Discoverability of the Accident Investigating Committee's Report, 31 GONz. L.
REV. 115, 117 (1995-96) (noting that although Richards was first case to apply privilege it "did

not set the parameters" and "[h]ence,jurisprudence recognizes Bredice ...as the source of the
privilege").
85. See Spencer Sav. Bank v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 844 (D.N.J.
1997) (concluding "that a self-critical analysis privilege does not exist at federal common law").
But see Morgan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 182 F.R.D. 261, 264 n.2 (N.D. IlI. 1998) (noting that as
of 1998 "no other court has adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Spencer Savings
court").
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documents.8 6 Still other courts decline to decide the issue, but even assuming the
privilege's viability, reject its application to the facts presented. 87 This part ofthe Note
considers the privilege's origins in Bredice, the wide variance in application at the
district court level, the few circuit courts of appeals decisions that have considered the
privilege's application, and finally, the one relevant Supreme Court case.
A. Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.-Origin of the Privilege
The basic premise underlying Bredice'srecognition of the privilege is that
significant public policies against discovery may outweigh a plaintiff's need for
certain information.88 The court noted in Bredice that valuable discussions
regarding "the efficiency of medical procedures and techniques" would be lost
if such conversations were opened to the discovery process. 89 The court stated
that "[t]he public interest may be a reason for not permitting inquiry into
particular matters by discovery." 90
Only "evidence of extraordinary
circumstances" justifies disclosing the information and overcomes the
significant public policy against disclosure. 9' Because the party seeking access
86. See, e.g., Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla.
1994) (recognizing privilege asserted to protect "reports which were prepared after the fact for
the purpose of candid self-evaluation and analysis of the cause and effect of past pollution"); see
also Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 270, 273 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (applying privilege to
safety reports and protecting reports from discovery in employment discrimination suit);
Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding "that the
intra-departmental memoranda contained within the District Attorney's special investigations
file are privileged and non-discoverable").
87. See, e.g., In re Mercury Fin. Co., No. 97-L-3035, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11236, at
*11 (N.D. 11. July 12, 1999) ("Even assuming the privilege does exist, [the defendant] fails to
meet its burden to show that the privilege should apply to bar production of the documents
requested."); see also Clawans v. United States, No. 98-3053, 98-3312, 94-4568, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18808, at *42 (D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2000) ("This evidence cannot plausibly be argued
to lie within the self-critical analysis privilege, assuming one exists."); Stabnow v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., No. 99-641(MJD/RLE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13612, at *20 (D. Minn.
Aug. 15, 2000) ("[E]ven if the 'self-critical analysis' privilege were extant in the State of
Minnesota-a prospect we necessarily leave open-the circumstances here do not warrant its
invocation."); Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 1:98-CV-3679-RWS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21025, at *31 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2000) (stating that "even assuming the recognition of some
form of self-critical analysis privilege in this district, both of the documents at issue are
documents to which any such privilege would have been waived").
88. See Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 27, at 1087 (noting that the "Bredice court
emphasized ...that the free flow of information is essential to promote recognized public
interests").
89. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970).
90. Id. (quoting 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.22(2), at 1287 (2d ed. 1969)).
91. Id. at251.
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to the documents did not show good cause for disclosure, the court refused to
order production of the requested records. 92
B. FederalDistrictCourts
93
Application of the self-critical analysis privilege is "problematic,
"confusing and analytically incoherent, 9 4 "murky,"95 "unsettled, 9 6 "largely
undefined," 97 surrounded by "uncertainty,"98 "a morass, ' 99 and is "inconsistent"
in its application.'0° The federal district courts are in a special position to
consider the privilege because it is in these courts that parties most often invoke
and attack the privilege.' 0' As noted earlier, courts vary wildly in the
application of the privilege, from outright denial of its existence to successful
implementation.'0 2 This Note attempts to limit the confusion surrounding the

92. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ineffect when Bredice was decided required
"that there be good cause for discovery to be obtained." FED. R.Civ. P.34 (amended 1970).
One court has stated that the Bredice court "did not need to address any privilege" without a
showing of good cause. Spencer Say. Bank v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F.Supp. 835, 839
(D.N.J. 1997). Accordingly, "Bredice should not be relied on as abasis for recognition of a new
federal common law privilege." Id.; see also Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and SelfCritical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity
Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 968 n.280 (1999) (stating that "[b]ecause good cause is no

longer required, the Bredice holding arguably isinapposite"). But see Robinson v. Magovern,
83 F.R.D. 79, 85 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (noting that although Bredice "was handed down before
the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a good cause showing was
required for the production of minutes and reports, the decision did not turn on that").
93. Abdallah, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21025, at *18.
94. Pollard, supra note 92, at 967.
95. Bacon, supra note 39, at 224.
96. Bush, supra note 27, at 602.
97. Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413,416 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (quoting Lloyd v.Cessna
Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 522 (E.D. Tenn 1977)).
98. Vandegrift, supranote 84, at 193; Christine A. Amalfe & Karen L. O'Keeffe, Road to
Self-Discovery Can Lead to Legal Discovery, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at B1S.
99. Gary J. Cohen, A Guide Through the Morass of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege,
35 ARiz.'ATT'Y 34 (July 1999).
100. McNab, supra note 49, at 686.
101. See Pollard, supra note 92, at 967 ("Various federal [district] courts produced a
myriad of decisions representing different models of privilege analysis."). "Ultimately, factually
indistinguishable cases produced directly contrary decisions .
I..."
ld.; see also Leahy, supra
note 50, at 50 ("Decisions upholding [the privilege's] existence and validity have almost
exclusively been relegated to the [federal] district courts.").
102. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing courts' varied stances on
privilege's applicability).
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privilege by structuring the discussion around the assertion of the privilege by

law enforcement agencies.
C. Courts ofAppeals
The federal circuit courts of appeals have provided little assistance to the
lower courts in clarifying the confusion surrounding the privilege.10 3 Perhaps
this lack of guidance is due to the great deference appellate courts give to trial
courts in discovery and evidentiary matters.'04 Several circuit courts of appeals
facing the issue have decided not to address the privilege's viability directly,
but rather find that it does not apply to the facts presented.' 0 5 Although the
circuit courts of appeals have not provided substantial guidance in the
application of the privilege,10 6 several have protected documents from
discovery in order to prevent the chilling effect disclosure has on an
organization's ability to conduct self-evaluation.' °7
1. Law Enforcement Context
Two circuits applied the self-critical analysis privilege, without explicitly

labeling their actions as such, in claims brought against law enforcement
agencies.108 At the trial court level in each case, motions in opposition of
103. See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 1:98-CV-3679-RWS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21025, at *18-19 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2000) (noting that "[v]ery few Circuit Courts of Appeals
have directly addressed the self-critical analysis privilege").
104. See, e.g., Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that Ninth Circuit reviews "a district court's rulings concerning discovery for abuse of
discretion"); Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that trial
court has great discretion in decisions regarding disclosure of government documents and that it
is "unusual and exceptional case where the determination of a trial court is set aside").
105. See, e.g., Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426 (stating that "[e]ven if such a privilege exists, the
justifications for it do not support its application to voluntary safety reviews").
106. See id. at 425 n. I (stating that "the circuit courts have neither definitively denied the
existence of such a privilege, nor accepted it and defined its scope").
107. See Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379,382 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(noting that "few federal appellate courts ...have suggested that the policy rationale underlying
the SCA [self-critical analysis privilege] are valid").
108. See Cruz v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 91-1547, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 187, at* 1 (4th
Cir. Jan. 7, 1993) (affirming trial court's denial of motion to compel discovery and grant of
summary judgment motion in suit alleging excessive force by Fairfax County police); Denver
Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirming
trial court's motion to compel discovery of staff inspection bureau files but noting exemption of
"any opinions or policy decisions of investigative officers").
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disclosure cited the executive privilege.'°9 However, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit balanced the plaintiff's need for the materials against the
county's fear of the negative effect that disclosure would have upon its ability
to effectively gather information." ° Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit balanced the parties' competing interests while affirming the trial
court's order to disclose only the factual aspects of police files."' While the
the privilege by name,"' several
circuit courts of appeals do not regularlyoncite
which it is based." 3
have used the underlying methodology

2. Accident Reports
Analysis regarding the production of accident reports is relevant to an
analysis of police files because both contain evaluations of a particular incident

and possible means of avoiding future occurrences of similar problems.1' 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to protect results of routine preaccident safety reviews from discovery in suits brought by plaintiffs injured
after the reports were conducted.'5 The court recognized the chilling effect
109. Cruz, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 187, at *2 (noting that both police chief and Fairfax
County were "[c]laiming executive privilege"); Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 437 (noting that the
"Association contends that disclosure would violate their executive or governmental privilege").
110. Cruz, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 187, at *7 (noting that trial court "struck a fair balance
that accommodated Cruz's interest-by providing him access to the factual components of the
report ...as well as the interests of the county in protecting sensitive information"). Fairfax
County argued that disclosure of the reports "would strike at the heart of any Department's
ability to fully and frankly investigate incidents of this type and to police its own as disclosure
has a 'chilling effect' upon the ability of police administrators to obtain candid information."
Id. at *6 (quoting Appellee's Br. at 14). Thus, their argument is grounded on the foundation of
the self-critical analysis privilege, namely "the concern that disclosure of documents reflecting
candid self-examination will deter or suppress socially useful investigations and evaluations."
Hardy v. N.Y. News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Ill. See Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 437-38 (noting that "any opinions or policy decisions of
investigative officers were exempt from discovery").
112. See Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d423,425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
that "the circuit courts have neither definitively denied the existence of such a privilege, nor
accepted and defined its scope").
113. See Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379,382 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(noting that "few federal appellate courts... have suggested that the policy rationales
underlying the SCA [self-critical analysis privilege] are valid").
114. See Leon v. County of San Diego, 202 F.R.D. 631, 637 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing
Dowling in denying assertion of privilege to shield documents related to provision of medical
care given to inmates).
115. See Dowling, 971 F.2d at 427 ("We hold that voluntary routine pre-accident safety
reviews are not protected by a privilege of self-critical analysis.").
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disclosure has on postaccident reviews but found no such rationale for
protecting pre-accident reviews."

6

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

declined to address this distinction because it found that even if the privilege
applied, it did not apply where a government agency sought production." 7 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, evenly split on
whether to allow discovery of a postaccident investigative report." 8
3. Affirmative Action Plans
Organizations often assert the privilege to protect affirmative action
plans." 9 These cases are relevant to a general assertion of the privilege by law
enforcement agencies primarily because of their acceptance of the policy
underlying the privilege. In addition, some departments assert the privilege to
protect reports from officers alleging discrimination.1 20 Both the Sixth and
District of Columbia Circuits expressly recognized the self-critical analysis
privilege in protecting employer reports from labor unions.' 2 ' The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced the same issue but found that the

116. See id.("The candid analysis of the causes of accidents is more likely to be stifled by a
disclosure requirement than would the routine review of safety concerns.").
117. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 214 F.3d 586,
593 n.420 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[tihe Fifth Circuit has not recognized the self-evaluation
privilege" but declining to "recognize such a privilege.., where a government agency seeks
pre-accident documents"); see also S. Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir. 1968)
(overturning trial court's order of production of accident report investigations because "fear of
discovery might deter it [the railway] from seeking full and candid evaluations of the cause of
accidents").
118. See Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498, 1500-01 (1lth Cir. 1987) (noting
that court was evenly divided and so "there is no useful purpose in the publication of opinions
setting forth the reasoning of either view").
119. See, e.g., Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 380 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (noting defendant's assertion of privilege to protect affirmative action plan and status
reports).
120. See, e.g., LaClair v. City of St. Paul, 187 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"the City wanted to exclude the results of a workplace assessment survey on the basis of an
alleged evidentiary privilege for self-critical analysis").
121. See Arasco, Inc. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d 194, 200 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he
practice of uninhibited self-critical analysis, which benefits both the union's and employer's
substantial interest in increased worker safety and accident prevention, would undoubtedly be
chilled by disclosure"); Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 28 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (stating that "[an employer's self-analysis, often including admissions and desirably
candid self-criticism, is necessarily chilled by a foreknowledge that the results of that analysis
must be disclosed to the union").
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defendant waived the privilege by voluntarily using its affirmative action plan
at trial.' 22
D, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC'23 is the most relevant Supreme
Court decision regarding the privilege of self-critical analysis. 2 4 In University
ofPennsylvania,the Court refused to recognize the peer review privilege in the
context of an EEOC investigation into alleged discrimination resulting from a
tenure decision. 125 The Court stated that it must construe any asserted privilege
"strictly" and refused to exercise its authority to develop the rules of privilege

122.

See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 552 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The voluntary

use by defendants at trial of their affirmative action efforts to prove nondiscrimination opened
the door and waived whatever qualified privilege may have existed.").

123. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990). In University ofPennsylvania, the Court
considered "whether a university enjoys a special privilege, grounded ineither the common law
or the First Amendment, against disclosure of peer review materials that are relevant to charges
of racial or sexual discrimination in tenure decisions." Id. at 184. Plaintiff Rosalie Tung was an
associate professor who was denied tenure. Id. at 185. Tung filed a complaint with the EEOC
alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. In the course of conducting its investigation, the EEOC
requested a number of documents relating to the tenure decision. Id. at 186. After the
University refused to produce the documents, the EEOC issued a subpoena ordering disclosure.
Id. The University applied for a "modification of the subpoena to exclude what it termed
'confidential peer review information."' Id. The EEOC rejected the appeal for modification.
Id. at 186-87. Both the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held for the EEOC and ordered enforcement of
the subpoena. Id. at 187. The Court began by noting that when Congress eliminated an
exemption to Title VII for educational institutions, Congress "did not see fit to create a privilege
for peer review documents." Id. at 189. Furthermore, adopting a requirement that the EEOC
demonstrate a specific reason for disclosure beyond a showing of relevance "would place a
substantial litigation-producing obstacle in the way of the Commission's efforts to investigate
and remedy alleged discrimination." Id. at 194. This requirement contravenes the EEOC's
important mission to discover invidious discrimination. Id. at 193. The Court noted that
Congress decided to subject educational institutions to Title VII and that "[i]f it dislikes the
result, it of course may revise the statute." Id. at 194. The Court also noted that the
University's First Amendment claim of academic freedom was inapplicable to the factual
scenario. Id. at 197. The Court unanimously affirmed the Third Circuit and refused to "accept
the University's invitation to create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review
materials." Id. at 189, 202.
124. See Reid, 199 F.R.D. at 382 (noting that "[t]he uncertainty surrounding the SCA [selfcritical analysis privilege] was furthered with the Supreme Court's decision").
125. See Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 192-93 (stating that University "does not offer any
persuasive justification" for providing greater level of protection for confidentiality of tenure
reports than Congress included in its amendments to Title VII).
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expansively. 2 6 The Court emphasized that Congress had considered the issue

of confidentiality12in7 its amendments to Title VII, but had not codified a peer

review privilege.
The Court did note that it can create and apply an evidentiary privilege
when it "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence."'128 Importantly, University of Pennsylvania did not
directly address the viability of the self-critical analysis privilege. 29 The Court
did not refer to the privilege "either expressly or by implication, and not one
13
case cited by the Court addresses it.,,
0 Thus, University of Pennsylvania
should be limited to the narrow facts before the court and should not be read as
a rejection of the privilege by the Court.13 ' Yet several32 courts have read the
opinion as a disapproval of the privilege by the Court.1
IV Competing Factors
Application of the self-critical analysis privilege requires a court to

balance competing factors in hopes of reaching a result that is both just and in
126. Id. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
127. See id. at 192 (noting that "Congress apparently considered the issue of
confidentiality, and it provided a modicum of protection" but declining to "strike the balance
differently from the one Congress adopted"); see also In re Nieri, No. MI 2-329, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 540, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2000) (noting that "the Supreme Court concentrated on a
factor not present in many other cases, namely, Congressional preemption").
128. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
129. See Peloso, supranote 37, at 247 (stating that "there isno evidence in the University
of Pennsylvania case of any intent on the part of the U.S. Supreme Court to erode the rationale"
of privilege). But see Kellogg, supra note 71, at 261 (stating that in UniversityofPennsylvania
"the Supreme Court refused to expand the self-critical analysis privilege").
130. Peloso, supra note 37, at 247.
131. See Johnson v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 206 F.R.D. 686, 691 (MD. Fla. 2002)
(stating that some courts and commentators have noted that because privilege was not
addressed, case should not be read as rejection of privilege and should be limited to facts);
Bush, supranote 27, at 613-14 (stating that "Universityof Pennsylvaniashould not jeopardize
future expansion of the SEP [self-evaluative privilege] outside the employment discrimination
context"). But see Simpson, supra note 35, at 591 (stating that in University of Pennsylvania

"the Court implicitly rejected the self-critical analysis privilege because the arguments
supporting it are so similar to the arguments the Court rejected" but noting that "Court did not
explicitly discuss the self-critical analysis privilege").
132. See In re Nieri, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 540, at *8 (noting that "some doubt about the
doctrine's continuing viability has arisen in light ofthe Supreme Court's analysis in University
of Pennsylvania");Kellogg, supra note 71, at 261 (stating that "[w]hile most courts recognize
existence of the privilege, many courts limited its application, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in University of Pennsylvania").
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the interests of the public as a whole. 3 3 The fear that disclosure to litigants will
hamper organizations' efforts at internal policing and improvement provides
the primary incentive to protect self-evaluative materials.134 This negative
effect on an organization's ability to engage in self-analysis manifests itself
both directly, in that disclosure provides a disincentive to an organization to
engage in self-critical analysis, and indirectly, because individual participants
are less likely to fully cooperate if their self-evaluations are discoverable.' 3
Part IV.A discusses the direct and indirect chilling effect of disclosure, the
fact/opinion distinction, an unfairness rationale behind protection of selfevaluations, invasion of privacy concerns, and discovery concerns related to
frivolous suits.' 36 Part IV.B considers the factors favoring disclosure., 37
A. FactorsFavoringProtection
The most important factor favoring protection is avoiding the chilling
effect disclosure may have on the ability of organizations to self-police
effectively. 3 This policy lies at the very heart of the privilege. 39 Courts often
require the asserting agency to establish that the reports contain the type of
0
information that would be cut off if disclosed. 14
The fact/opinion distinction
133. See Loigman v. Kirmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 106 (1986) (noting that "implicit in the
concept is ajudicial weighing" of "public interest in confidentiality" and "the citizen's right of
access"). The court cites a decision by Justice Brennan, writing as a Superior Court judge, as an
example of the balancing of public good and confidentiality. Id. at 105; see also Vandegrift,
supra note 84, at 176 (noting that "court which is called upon to rule on the privilege must
balance two competing interests: the public interest in protecting candid ...self-assessments
and the private interest of the litigant"). But see Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189
(1990) (noting that Congress had "considered the relevant competing concerns" in academic
peer review discrimination context and stating that this "balancing of conflicting interests ...is
particularly a legislative function").
134. See Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (noting
that self-critical analysis privilege "is grounded on the premise that disclosure of documents
reflecting candid self-examination will deter or suppress socially useful investigations and
evaluations").
135. See Seif-Critical Analysis, supra note 27, at 1091-93 (discussing "dual chilling effect
of disclosure of self-critical analyses").
136. See infra Part IV.A (discussing factors favoring protection).
137. See infra Part IV.B (discussing factors favoring disclosure).
138. See Bacon, supra note 39, at 223 ("The first rudimentary reason for protecting this
type of information is to avoid so-called 'chilling effects."').
139. See Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The policy
behind the privilege is 'to assure that subordinates within an agency will feel free to provide the
decision maker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations."').
140. See id. at 64 ("[C]ourts have declined to apply the privilege of self-critical analysis
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and the invasion of privacy concerns relate to an agency's ability to gather
suits
reliable data. 14 ' The unfairness rationale and protection from frivolous
142
may buttress a court's decision to protect the internal investigations.
1. Chilling Effect on Self-Examinations
a. Direct Chill

Some courts recognize that disclosure to litigants of internal investigations
or evaluations acts as a disincentive to conduct these programs for agencies
interested in improving safety and performance. 143 Police departments may
avoid resolving internal problems if plaintiffs may subsequently use the selfevaluative data detailing the problems in a civil suit against the department. 44
Given the fact that organizations and individuals generally ignore their internal
inadequacies, refusing to conduct self-critical analysis simply maintains the
status quo. 45 Defenders of the privilege argue46that it promotes socially
beneficial self-evaluations of police departments.

when the proponent of the privilege fails to show that the process would be curtailed if
discovery were allowed.").
141. See Boyd v. Gullett, 64 F.R.D. 169, 178 (D. Md. 1974) (stating that deletion of certain
private information and protection of"[m]aterial of a non-factual nature... may be necessary to
protect the decision making process in the various government agencies").
142. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing unfairness factor).
143. See Urseth v. CityofDayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (noting that
"it is counter-productive to create the spectre that opinions expressed in frank and open firearms
hearings" could be used against department in subsequent litigation). "In order to preserve this
important vehicle for self-evaluation, participating police department supervisors must be
allowed to engage in the type of free-flowing exchange of ideas which can lead to honest
reflection and considered re-evaluation of past practices." Id.
144. See Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting
sheriffs office assertion of privilege to protect results of investigation of hogtying of arrested
individuals "because of the need for a free flow of information regarding police procedures and
criticisms of those procedures").
145. See Allen & Hazelwood, supra note 42, at 357 (noting that discoveries of internal
"housekeeping" investigations act as "incentives to avoid aggressive managerial action [and
thereby] increase[] the possibility that illegal, unethical, and inefficient conduct will not become
known by the corporation, thus decreasing the ability of the corporation to respond with
appropriate managerial action").
146. See Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 27, at 1088 (stating that courts that "have
shielded from discovery the results of police department investigations" have done so in
recognition of "the public interest in permitting police departments to conduct thorough
investigations to reduce the number of improper police actions").
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Law enforcement agencies play a crucial role in maintaining order and48
promoting justice. 147 These interests undoubtedly are of utmost importance'
and proper police documentation is essential to a department's efficiency and
reputation. 49 Less certain is whether the self-critical analysis privilege serves
to promote departmental self-evaluation and preserve the flow of
interdepartmental information necessary for effective policing. "°
Law enforcement agencies have an inherent obligation to correct internal
problems due to the overwhelming public interest in their effective
functioning.' 5' Thus, the self-critical analysis privilege is in this sense
paradoxical because a greater public interest in correcting police problems
corresponds to a greater built-in incentive to self-correct, and a lesser need for
the protection afforded by the privilege.' 52 This argument assumes that
147. See SAM S. SOURYAL, ETHICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH 91
(1992) (quoting "law enforcement code" for proposition that "law enforcement officer['s] ...
fundamental duty is to serve mankind; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent

against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against
violence or disorder; and to respect the constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality, and

justice"); see also ALAN COFFEY ET AL.,
COMMUNITY

HUMAN RELATnONS: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A CHANGING

160 (3d. ed. 1982) (stating that "responsibility of the police officer is basically to

protect the life and property, regulate the conduct, and minister to the needs of people of all
classes of life").
148. See Urseth, 653 F. Supp. at 1061 ("The public's interest in self-evaluation by the
Dayton Police Department is beyond doubt.").
149. See EARL M. SWEENEY, THE PUBLIC AND THE POLICE: A PARTNERSHIP IN PROTECTION
15-16 (1982) (stating that police officers, and "[e]ven written police reports," are viewed by

public as "a symbol of law, order, justice, bravery, vigilance, and integrity").
150. See Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (recognizing
"that police department self-evaluation and remedial action do serve an important police policy,
but such policy will not be hindered by the disclosure ordered here"); see also Note, Making
Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (7I)logic ofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1350-51 (1992) (noting that much of debate surrounding privilege focuses
on "the empirical validity" of privilege's underpinning that discovery curtails flow of useful
information).
151. See Skibov. City ofNew York, 109F.R.D. 58, 63-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
"public has a strong interest in the police department's ability to investigate its personnel and

improve its procedures" and that police department must "continue to monitor itself to ensure
that department procedures are effective"); see also PAUL B. WESTON & PHILIP K. FRALEY,
POLICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 139 (1980) (stating that in order to "achieve its stated
objectives" police department must utilize performance appraisals to identify any "employee
whose work performance is substandard" and take "prompt remedial action").
152. See Bush, supranote 27, at 597-98 (noting that responsibilities for corrections have
shifted internally and that "[t]hese developments urge aggressive managerial action, both to
honor contemporary social mores to which an organization may subscribe, and to advert adverse
publicity and potential liability"). However, responding to these internal pressures to be a more
socially responsible organization may lead an organization to invest "substantial time and
financial resources to produce a 'smoking gun' for its opponents infuture litigation" if assertion
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agencies recognize this built-in incentive through an appreciation of the
weighty public interest. Detractors of the privilege cite a lack of evidence
negating this assumption as evidence of the assumption's validity. 5 3
Most courts balance the competing interests as asserted on an individual,
case-by-case basis. 5 4 Assertions of the privilege by departments require a
detailed description of the harm the assertions seek to prevent. 55 Thus, courts
often place the burden of proving that the information will cease to flow if the
court allows discovery on the agency. 56 Vague references by an agency to
possible beneficial ends generally will not outweigh a plaintiff's specific
request for information important to her case. 5 7 The self-critical analysis
privilege provides the agency with the framework and terminology necessary to

demonstrate the harm of disclosure.' 58

b. Indirect Chill
Individual officers' concerns regarding possible personal or departmental
repercussions from fully cooperating with self-investigations represent the
of privilege is rejected. Id. at 599.
153. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 664 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that
reasoning behind privilege is "empirically unsupported" and problematic because "it
acknowledges the great importance of enforcing federal civil rights policies [but] fails to
articulate a reason for deciding to ascribe less weight to that enforcement effort than to the
unmeasured harm to government interests that might follow from disclosure of evaluative
material in internal affairs files").
154. See, e.g., Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(weighing "the defendants' need for the memoranda against the District Attorney's assertion that
disclosure of its internal memoranda will have a chilling effect upon the agency's
effectiveness").
155. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 621 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that
assertion "that disclosure of citizen complaints would adversely impact the public's interest in
having the police department critically evaluate the quality of its services" is too "general [an]
assertion of harm to the public interest" to warrant protection for documents).
156. See Skibo, 109 F.R.D. at 64 ("[C]ourts have declined to apply the privilege of self
critical analysis when the proponent of the privilege fails to show that the process would be
curtailed if discovery is allowed.").
157. See Taylor v. L.A. Police Dep't, 1999 WL 33101661, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1999)
(stating that "a general assertion that a police department's internal investigatory system would
be harmed is insufficient" grounds to deny discovery); see also Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45,
46 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (granting motion for protective order after police chief summarized in
detail which documents he would willingly submit and which would hamper investigation into
possible disciplinary action).
158. See Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 27, at 1087 (stating that privilege "applies to a
number of similar problems and ... has generally applicable parameters"); see also Leonard,
supra note 37, at 123-24 (proposing model codification of privilege).
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indirect chilling effect that disclosure has on the effectiveness of such
investigations.' 59 Law enforcement agencies likely will be unable to get
reliable information from their employees if the officers fear this information
will be available for a plaintiff's use in future suits against the individual
officers, their colleagues, or the department as a whole. 60 Disclosure of
officers' self-assessments and critiques of coworkers' performances to hostile
6
parties curtails the channels necessary for frank and open communication.1 1
Based on a foundation similar to the self-critical analysis privilege, the
attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications based upon
public policy concerns regarding the chilling effect of disclosure. 62 Thus, the
attorney-client privilege recognizes that fostering open dialogue between parties
often requires that the communications not be used as weapons against those
159.

See Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (stating that officers'

"knowledge that some of the confidential information recorded might be later exposed to outside
parties would have a certain and chilling effect upon the internal use of such record making");
see also Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1062 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (noting that
"chilling effect [on personnel involved in Firearms Committee] which would accompany the
disclosure of these documents is reduced" by prior public testimony about committee meeting);
Self-CriticalAnalysis, supranote 27, at 1092 ("[Clourts must be aware of the chilling effect not
only on the self-analyst, but also on persons asked to supply the data that make internal analyses
possible.").
160. See Elliot v.Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293,296 (D. Idaho 1983) (denying motion to compel
brought by plaintiff in § 1983 suit seeking results of psychological evaluations and polygraph
examination based on asserted "detrimental effect on the future ability of the department to
conduct such tests" and resulting deterrence on "full cooperation of the participants").
161. See Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting
defendants' claim that review of county's hogtying procedures should be privileged "because of
the need for a free flow of information regarding police procedures and criticisms of those
procedures"). The court ultimately rejected assertion of the privilege because of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises,Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (1992),

precluding protection of "routine internal reviews of matters related to safety concerns." Id.
Whether these documents were "routine" reviews or self-evaluations concerning a particular
problem facing the department is unclear from the opinion. See id. at 617 (describing
documents as "obtained by or relied upon by the San Diego County Sheriff's Department in
formulating policies").
162.

See Laural C. Alexander, Should Alabama Adopt a Physician-PatientEvidence

Privilege?, 45 ALA. L. REv. 261, 264 n.26 (1993) (noting that "basis for the attorney-client
privilege [has] shifted from 'honor' to the necessity for open communications between attorney
and client"); Bush, supra note 27, at 603 (noting that "[m]any courts and commentators have
recognized public policy as a legitimate rationale for restricting broad pretrial discovery" and
the self-critical analysis privilege "represents a specific manifestation of this public policy
limitation on discovery"); Alexander A. Meyers, ProtectiveFunctionPrivilege: A Study of the
Proposed 'ProtectiveFunctionPrivilege': CompellingSecret Service Testimony, 1999 ANN.

SuRv. AM. L. 43, 48-49 (noting that "the primary reasoning behind the modem attorney-client
privilege" is recognition of fact that "benefit to justice of encouraging societal obedience
outweighs the benefit of individual testimony").
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involved. 163 Courts might easily import this reasoning into the debate over the
self-critical analysis privilege. 64 In addition, empirical evidence shows that the
attorney-client privilege does enhance candor among parties; courts may choose
to consider this as evidence that the self-critical analysis privilege will do the
same. 165
Another similarity between these two privileges is that the attorney-client
privilege protects only the communications and not the underlying facts in
much the same way that the self-critical analysis privilege protects only
evaluations or opinions and not the factual basis from which those opinions are
drawn.16 6 While scholars and courts debate the wisdom of this distinction, 6 7
most courts that recognize the self-critical analysis privilege protect only the
subjective aspects of self-evaluations, realizing that this is the type of
163. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (198 1) ("The narrow scope given
the attorney-client privilege by the court below not only makes it difficult for corporate
attorneys to formulate sound advice.., but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of
corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law."); see also Trina Jones,
Inadvertent Disclosureof PrivilegedInformation and the Law ofMistake: Using Substantive
Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1313 (1999)
(discussing split of authority on whether inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged
information can be used against disclosing party); Peloso, supra note 37, at 247 (stating that to
extent documents "are related to an organization's self-audit in order to conform to regulatory
requirements, the [self-critical analysis] privilege is merely a necessary extension of the
attorney-client privilege").
164. See Bush, supra note 27, at 626 (noting that courts could justify expansion of selfcritical analysis privilege "based upon the fundamental principles that underlie" attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine). An example of a fundamental principle underlying each
privilege is "the voluntary compliance model of corporate regulation." Id. at 626-27.
165. See Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the
Participants,63 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 191, 244 (1989) (noting that clear majority of attorneys and
CEOs believe that privilege enhances candor).
166. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395 ("The [attorney-client] privilege only protects
disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those
who communicated with the attorney."); see also Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicabilityof the SelfCriticalAnalysis Privilegeto the Drug and Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 93,
99-100 (1997) (noting that rationale underlying attorney/client privilege "is similar to that
underlying the self-critical analysis privilege" and that "attorney-client privilege ... protects
only the confidential communication itself [but not] the underlying information nor the selfcritical evaluations of aclient are protected"). But see Bush, supra note 27, at 627 (noting that
"traditional privileges afford primacy to the factual investigation stage" and proposing
expansion of self-critical analysis privilege "primarily upon protecting factual investigative
material").
167. See Bush, supra note 27, at 609 (noting that limiting privilege's protection to opinion
"ignores the fact that informed, sound legal decision-making depends entirely upon accurate
factual information"); Self-CriticalAnalysis, supra note 27, at 1100 (concluding that courts
should "recognize all of the various ways in which self-analysis may be chilled, and protect
factual portions of self-analyses that meet the privilege's criteria").
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information
that will most likely be restricted through the indirect chill of
1 68
discovery.
Some courts have cast the argument regarding the indirect chilling effect
in terms of the honesty of law enforcement agents.1 69 This view overlooks
several important distinctions. First, the difference between obtaining a
meaningful, in-depth self-critical analysis and simply going through the
motions does not depend solely upon the honesty of those involved, but also on
70

critical factors such as thoroughness, motivation and departmental habits.1

Second, feelings of distrust and suspicion sometimes develop between officers
and internal affairs units, unrelated to issues of honesty on either side.171
Knowledge that these investigations may be used later against the department,
by outsiders no less, simply aggravates this possibly antagonistic, uncooperative
attitude.'72 Finally, law enforcement officers engage in a dangerous, sometimes
deadly occupation.'
This high level of stress and mutual dependence on
fellow officers may develop into an "us against them" mentality. 74 Disclosure
168. See Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 296 (D. Idaho 1983) (granting motion to compel
results of internal investigations, but only factual aspects, in recognition of assertion that
disclosure of evaluative aspects would "discourage members of the Boise City Police
Department from coming forward and bringing matters appropriate for disciplinary review to the
attention of their superiors, and discourage complete, accurate and candid disciplinary reviews
which are necessary in providing quality police services to the community").
169. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 664 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that
some courts incorrectly assume that police officers "doing this work [internal affairs
investigations] would not express their views honestly if they knew their words might be used
against individual officers or the police department by a civil rights plaintiff').
170. See Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("What
was asked in the interviews and what answers were given will reflect the degree to which agood
faith investigation was carried out and may suggest whether the ultimate and partially adverse
disposition of plaintiffs complaint was based on the evidence obtained or on an unspoken
policy .. ").
171. See EDWARD A. MALLOY, THE ETICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT 38 (1982) (noting officers' "strong identification with their co-workers" and
"strong suspicion about.., hostile interventions into police life").
172. See Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45, 46 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (granting protective order
preventing discovery of internal investigation files "designed to determine whether disciplinary
action should be pursued" on grounds "that such discovery would impair [the department's]
ability to obtain the internal reporting necessary to provide for efficient police force").
173. See ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTOF THE
UNITED STATES (120th ed. 2000) (Table No. 355) (listing annual numbers of law enforcement
agents assaulted and killed from 1990-1998).
174. See George L. Kirkham, A Professor's "Street Lessons", FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
March 1974, at 20 (describing professor's experience working as police officer for six months).
"The same kinds of daily stresses which affected my fellow officers soon began to take their toll
on me." Id. "I became sick and tired of being reviled and attacked by criminals... [and of]
living under the axe of news media and community pressure groups, eager to seize upon the

BEHIND THE SHIELD?

1637

of internal reviews-that is, forced disclosure of "us" discussing how we can
better ourselves to "them"--can only hamper a department's attempts to operate
in the best interests of society. 175
2. Fact/OpinionDistinction
As noted earlier, courts often protect the evaluative aspects of an internal
analysis while ordering disclosure of the underlying facts. 176 By drawing this
distinction, courts respect the important policies underlying the privilege while
simultaneously providing plaintiffs with ample ammunition to state their
claims) 7 7 Courts' protection of opinion allows law enforcement agencies to
fully investigate themselves without fear of honest evaluations being used as
weapons in subsequent suits.' 78 Protection of factual material strikes both
courts and commentators as unwarranted and unnecessary to further the policies
underlying the privilege. 7 9
slightest mistake made by myself [sic] or a fellow officer." Id.; see also Brown v. Thompson,
430 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1970) (Coleman, J., dissenting) ("I am well aware that a
favorite ploy of the law violator is to discourage law enforcement officials by suing them on
some pretext or another, false arrest or malicious prosecution... if an officer dares arrest one of
them or has to hurt him in the line of duty.").
175. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 664 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Some courts
have concluded that evaluative comments and opinions expressed by officers conducting
internal affairs investigations should be protected by a privilege that is almost absolute."). The
court in Kelly rejected this line of thinking based on lack of empirical support and private
incentives for disclosure. Id. at 665-66.
176. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing fact/opinion distinction).
177. See Boyd v. Gullett, 64 F.R.D. 169, 178 (D. Md. 1974) (noting that appropriate
"restrictions on discovery" of police files include limiting discovery of "[m]aterial of a nonfactual nature, i.e., official criticisms, recommendations of action, policy recommendations or
opinions of supervisory personnel" which should be "submitted to the court for in camera
review"). The court stated that "[a]lthough the latter materials could well be relevant to the
plaintiffs' case, some supervision of discovery may be necessary to protect the decision making
process in the various government agencies involved in this case." Id.
178. See Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293,296-97 (D. Idaho 1983) (stating that "evaluative
summaries or recommendations" contained in police department's internal investigation are not
discoverable due to "the serious detrimental effect on the future ability of the department" to
obtain reliable information). But see Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 664 (criticizing analysis in Elliot and
similar cases as "unsupported and very debatable").
179. See Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-12 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (stating that after
conducting incamera review the court found "[a]ll the material in the file [to be] of a factual as
opposed to a policy discussion nature, and nowhere in the file are there any recommendations
made for future action or criticisms of past actions" and concluding that while "defendant's
arguments may have merit," protecting factual reports would not "impair the ability of the Chief
of Police to obtain full and candid reporting from police of their activities because of a chilling
effect"); Weiss, supra note 27, at 161 ("Because the quality of the facts and statistics compiled
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Law enforcement agencies should clearly label various aspects of their
internal evaluations.180 Failure to do so further muddles the already unclear line
between fact and opinion. 81 If agencies clearly draw the fact and opinion
distinction, the harm brought about by disclosure becomes more readily
apparent to courts applying the privilege.18 2 Conducting investigations with
this distinction in mind, carefully reporting results in a manner most likely to
highlight the evaluative nature of analyses, and making a detailed description of
provides a court with a sufficient basis for
the evaluative nature of 8documents
3
enforcing the privilege.
3. Unfairness
Some courts and commentators view allowing parties to use their
opponents' self-critical analysis as a weapon to be an unfair practice.'1 4 In this
has no real relationship to the confidentiality fostered by the [privilege], and because their
accuracy is readily verifiable and often available notwithstanding the privilege, the rationale
behind the privilege is not applicable to this objective type of information."). But see supra note
167 and accompanying text (noting that several commentators argue that factual information
should be protected).
180. See Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(protecting assistant district attorneys' memoranda that clearly referred to "steps taken by the
assistant district attorneys incompleting their investigation, and their professional opinions on
the merits of the plaintiff's complaint, and their recommendations to the file and to higherranking officials within the Office").
181. See Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413, 418 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (noting that "the
circumstances presented by virtue of this case demonstrate good cause requiring disclosure...
since both factual data not otherwise obtainable by the Plaintiff and evaluations of the Task
Force are intertwined within the Report").
182. See Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 112-13 (1986) (noting that "after
evaluating the detailed description of the material furnished to it by the Attorney General," court
must consider various factors in deciding whether to order disclosure including "the degree to
which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports").
183. SeeTorresv. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp. 1201, 1215 (D.N.J. 1996) (ordering disclosure
of internal affairs report over assertion of privilege because "the report consists largely of facts
underlying the investigation [and] ...there has been no showing that the report was undertaken
as part of an institutional-wide or department-wide process of evaluation and self-improvement,
nor is this information the type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed").
184. See Self-Evaluative Reports, supra note 64, at 819 (noting that "it may simply seem
unfair to allow a party's careful self-assessment to be used against him"); see also Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) (protecting attorney's work product from discovery because
"[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files
and the mental impressions of an attorney"). But see Vandegrift, supra note 84, at 183 (stating
that allowing parties to use favorable reports but protecting unfavorable ones from discovery is
unfair and "cuts against application of the privilege").
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sense, the self-critical analysis privilege is similar to the ban on admission of
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence found in the Federal Rules
of Evidence.' 85 Both methods of excluding relevant evidence work to prevent
future problems by encouraging self-help. 6 Similarly, each method recognizes
the basic unfairness in requiring parties to produce for subsequent lawsuits a
"smoking gun" that they created in an attempt to correct perceived
87
shortcomings internally.'
4. Privacy
Assertion of the privilege often accompanies an attempt to protect an
individual officer's right to privacy.' 88 Courts should consider striking personal
information in recognition of the possible harm disclosure might bring about.' 89

This anonymity furthers an agency's ability to conduct self-evaluations by
reducing the possible indirect chill on individual officers' candor.' 90 Other
courts have been more skeptical of the privilege's assertion in regard to these

privacy rights, relying on other mechanisms of protection.' 9'
185. See Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 298 (D. Idaho 1983) (denying production of
officers' disciplinary and reinstatement hearings because "requested records and transcripts
appear to fall within the theory behind Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence since they
appear to be essentially remedial in nature"); see also McCowan & Gregoire, supra note 84, at
116 ("The privilege is analogous to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which excludes
evidence of subsequent remedial measures.").
186. See McCowan & Gregoire, supra note 84, at 116 (noting that two privileges are
analogous inthat they each function to eliminate future problems); see also Vandegrift, supra
note 84, at 190 (stating that Rule 407 of Federal Rules of Evidence and privilege "are
analogous, and the policy considerations underlying one should buttress the arguments in favor
of the other").
187.

See Self-Evaluative Reports, supra note 64, at 821 (stating that "if evidence of

remedial measures is inadmissible, the deliberations, recommendations, opinions and
conclusions leading up to the measures must also be inadmissible to give the exclusion its
proper effect").
188. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 230 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
(considering assertion of privilege by city and individual officers and balancing "the need for
the requested information against the privacy rights argued by the defendants").
189. See Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986) (stating that when analyzing
assertion ofprivilege courts should consider "the effect disclosure may have upon persons who
have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance that their identities would not
be disclosed").
190. See supra Part IV.A. L.b (discussing indirect chilling effect disclosure has on agencies'
ability to acquire information).
191. See Taylor v.L.A. Police Dep't, 1999 WL 33101661, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1999)
(stating that "plaintiff's need for the requested information outweighs any invasion of
defendants' privacy rights" and that officers' "privacy interest may be sufficiently protected with
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5. Frivolous Claims

In addition, courts must determine whether the lawsuit has any merit before
permitting disclosure of sensitive documents.' 92 Some courts refuse to allow a

plaintiff with a suspect claim to conduct a fishing expedition that would require the
disclosure of sensitive information.' 93 The balancing of interests the privilege
requires only makes sense when the plaintiff has a legitimate claim. 194 Other courts
are more leery ofjudging the strength of the plaintiff's case without discovery of the
police documents because the strength of a plaintiff's claim may not be apparent
the
until after the discovery process has run its course.' These courts emphasize
196
policy of broad discovery behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. FactorsFavoringDisclosure
1. Public Interestin Plaintiffs'Success
Individuals suing police officers and law enforcement agencies often assert
violations of fundamental constitutional rights.' 97 Courts recognize the substantial
the use of a tightly drawn protective order" (internal punctuation and citations omitted)).
192. See Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("In the context of
discovery of police investigation files in a civil rights case... the following considerations
should be examined... [including] whether the plaintiffs suit is non-frivolous and brought in
good faith.").
193. See Cruz v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 91-1547, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 187, at *7-10
(4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1993) (stating that plaintiff "requested a vast amount of highly sensitive
material with little or no notion of what he might find" and noting that he "has come forward
with no evidence whatsoever," only vague and conclusory allegations, that would support claim
for municipal liability).
194. See Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1218 (5th Cir. 1970) (Coleman, J.,
dissenting) (stating that frivolous suits "ought not to be encouraged beyond the requirements of
due process, especially in a case admittedly without merit unless something can be turned up by
fishing files presently confidential").
195. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 666--67 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that
although courts "must beware... of permitting frivolous claimants to harass law enforcement
agencies... courts must be careful not to pre-judge the merits of claims whose strength may be
demonstrable only after the very discovery that is in issue" and that "[d]oubts must be resolved,
at the discovery stage, in favor of the claimant").
196. See Taylor, 1999 WL 33101661, at *2-6 (noting that Rule 26(b)( I) of Federal Rules
Civil Procedure should be "liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery" and to permit
consideration of "plaintiff's need for the requested information" indecisions granting plaintiff
limited access to police reports).
197. See King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that "[c]ivil rights
lawsuits against local law enforcement officers occur with sufficient frequency in this
district ... that the test specifically tailored to resolving the discovery disputes in those cases
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public interest in protecting individual liberties.' Lawsuits function not only as a
means of achieving restitution for an individual's damages but also as a checking
mechanism for prevention of future violations.'" Private litigants act on behalf of
the public's welfare by ensuring that law enforcement agencies that violate their
duty to serve and protect pay a substantial price.2°
Of course, the public interest in organizations acting in an informed
and socially beneficial manner lies at the foundation of the self-critical
analysis privilege. 20 ' Determining whether successful assertion of the
privilege effectively promotes this interest without undermining a
plaintiff's attempt at seeking redress requires a case-by-case balancing.0 2
Courts need to recognize the resulting paradox: as the public and private
interest in seeking vindication of agencies' lapses through private
litigation becomes greater, the public interest in effective investigation
and evaluation secured by the privilege, through nondisclosure,
correspondingly increases. 203 This reasoning underlies the privilege's
requirement that the information litigants seek to protect must be the type
whose flow would be restricted if discovery were allowed. 2° Courts
needs repeating").
198. See Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 664 (noting that plaintiff in civil rights law suit brought
against city and its police department is "attempting simultaneously to enforce his rights and
policies that the people, speaking through Constitutional amendments and federal statutes, have
elevated to the highest levels of priority").
199. See Wood v.Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, I1 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (noting that by allowing private
suits for violations of Constitutional rights, 18 U.S.C. § 1983 "represents a balancing feature in
our government structure whereby individual citizens are encouraged to police those who are
charged with policing us all").
200. See id. at 10-11 ("Each citizen 'acts as a private attorney general who takes on the
mantel of the sovereign,' guarding for all of us the individual liberties enunciated in the
Constitution.").
201. See Torres v.Kuzniasz, 936 F.Supp. 1201, 1214 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating that purpose
behind self-critical analysis privilege is to "further the public interest in institutional selfanalysis and improvement").
202. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("What the
interests of law enforcement are, and how much weight to ascribe to them, can vary with both
the kind of information in question and the situation in which it is being sought."); Wood, 54
F.R.D. at I I (noting that decisions on whether to protect police investigations from discovery
"must be done on a case by case ad hoc basis by balancing the applicable public policies and the
material sought to be discovered in each individual case").
203. See Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 63-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (recognizing
public's "strong interest in the police department's ability to investigate its personnel and
improve its procedures" and government's "vital interest in upholding the civil rights of the
populace").
204. See Torres, 936 F.Supp. at 1214-15 (noting that successful assertion of privilege
requires that "the information [contained in the analysis] must be of the type whose flow would
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should provide litigants with reasonable discovery if doing so will not
cause injury to an agency's ability to conduct a thorough and effective
self-analysis.0 5
2. Right to Every Man's Evidence
Federal courts permit a broad range of discovery in an attempt to
facilitate the search for truth and justice.0 6 Courts disfavor privileges
because privileges hamper the fact-finding process by keeping
information from the jury.207 While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
recognize that socially beneficial policies may require that some
information be unavailable in discovery,20 8 the overall approach provides
for open discovery. 209 This presumption of openness accompanies an
assertion of any privilege but may weigh more heavily with the selfcritical analysis privilege because it is not universally accepted.21 0

be curtailed if discovery were allowed").

205. See Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24,35 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (affirming

trial court's order granting motion to compel results of city's investigation into performance of
prison health subcontractor because defendants "have not established that, absent the selfcritical analysis privilege, the City would not evaluate the performance of Prison Health").
206. See Taylor v. L.A. Police Dep't, 1999 WL 33101661, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1999)
(noting that Rule 26(b)(1) of Federal Rules Civil Procedure should be "liberally interpreted to
permit wide-ranging discovery").
207. See Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 664 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that "privileges operate in
derogation of the truth finding process"), Flanagan, supra note 30, at 551 ("Any new privilege
runs counter to the current strongjudicial trend towards restricting evidentiary privileges and is
inconsistent with the existing broad scope of permissible discovery.").
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing for "discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action"); see also
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that purpose of attorney-client
privilege "isto encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice"); Kellogg, supranote 71,at 255-56 ("The primary justification for privileges isthat if
confidential communications or documents are subject to discovery in litigation, this lack of
complete confidentiality will negatively affect numerous socially-useful functions and
relationships.").
209. See Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 13 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (stating that "the federal rules
of discovery [are] meant to insure that no relevant facts remain hidden").
210. See McNab, supra note 49, at 675 ("When establishing anew area of privilege, such
as self-criticism privilege, courts attempt to base their decisions on the policies andjustifications
that support existing privileges ...[and] to justify any exception to this general maxim [of
openness] by examining the reasoning that has justified previous exclusions.").
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3. Plaintiff's ParticularizedNeed
Courts often consider the overall effect that denying a plaintiff
access to documents would have on the status of the plaintiff's case.2 1'
Generally, the relevance of the internal evaluations is undisputed."
However, the issue of relevance may require a fact-specific analysis of
the underlying documents and events giving rise to the claim.21 3 A few
courts have conducted in camera reviews of documents in order to
determine their relevance.21 4
One specific fact pattern that routinely emerges in suits against law
enforcement agencies concerns the liability of governmental bodies.
Assume a plaintiff alleges brutality or excessive force by a police officer
and sues the city employer for his injuries. 215 In order for the city to be
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the
constitutional deprivation arose from a governmental custom, policy, or
The defendant city attempts to deny access to personnel
practice.
2 9
28
,
files, 2 17 internal investigations, ' and departmental self-evaluations.
211. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that
plaintiff's "need for the requested personnel files is great... [and] that the information
contained in police personnel files is unlikely to be available from any other source"). But see
Self-CriticalAnalysis, supra note 27, at 1099 ("[T]he importance of the material sought by the
plaintiff actually makes the operation of the privilege's rationale more likely... [because) [t]he
more crucial the material isto the plaintiff's case, the more likely it is to be the type of material
that the privilege was designed to protect.").
212. See Kott v. Perini, 283 F.Supp. I, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (noting that "relevance of the
[police records] sought to be discovered by petitioner is not seriously in dispute"). But see
Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 298 (D. Idaho 1983) (denying production of officers'
disciplinary and reinstatement hearings and noting "slight relevancy of such remedial
proceedings").
213. See Bergman v.Kemp, 97 F.R. D.413, 418 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that "a specific
need for this evidence is apparent where all information relative to the actions of [the officer]
with regard to the.., incident is inthe hands of a party Defendant").
214. See, e.g., Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 25-26 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (protecting twenty-one intradepartmental memoranda after in camera review and
consideration of numerous factors including "the relevance of the evidence sought to be
protected").
215. See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(involving widow suing officers and county after husband died during arrest).
216. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Local governing
bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers.").
217. See Scouler v. Craig, 116 F.R.D. 494, 495 (D.N.J. 1987) (involving defendant
township arguing against motion to compel officer's personnel file).
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Courts recognize that often the documents containing the results of the
critiques may be the only way to establish the city's liability.220 This
factor may weigh heavily in favor of disclosure.22 1
V. Implementation
The following examples attempt to apply the previous policy discussion to
factual scenarios a court might face. Courts need to recognize not only the
public interest served by private plaintiffs but also the socially beneficial results

of law enforcement agencies conducting self-evaluations.222 Defendants
attempting to protect self-critical analysis carry the burden of persuading a
court that specific harms will flow from disclosure.22 3 These examples
highlight the difficulties defendants face.
A. Example One-Alleged Assault by Officer
John Smith is arrested by Officer Able for disturbing the peace and public
intoxication. Smith appears intoxicated and under the influence of narcotics.
Private citizens witness the arrest and see no evidence of excessive force.
When Smith is processed at the police station, he has a bleeding lip, swelling
around both eyes and a laceration on his forehead. Smith alleges that Able
clubbed him repeatedly with his nightstick while Smith was detained in the
218. See Manns v. Smith, 181 F.R.D. 329,330-31 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (remanding denial
of plaintiffs "motion to compel production of all aspects of the Charleston Police Department's
internal investigation into the Smith-Manns incident").
219. See Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (involving
city seeking protective order for transcript of Firearms Committee meeting and summary of
conclusions).
220. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that "the
information contained in police personnel files is unlikely to be available from any other
source"); Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 62-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting motion
to compel internal affairs procedural manual because it "contains information that plaintiffs
need to determine whether adequate techniques are used to investigate complaints against police
officers... [and] [s]uch a determination is crucial in order for plaintiffs to establish their theory
that the city maintains a policy of supervisory indifference to and tacit approval of police
misconduct").
221. See Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting
that "[tihe key consideration is the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff's case"
especially when considering "issue of municipal liability under section 1983" (internal citations
and punctuation omitted)).
222. See supra Part IV.A. I (discussing dual chilling effect of disclosure).
223. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing burden on defendant).
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patrol car. Officer Able claims that Smith inflicted the wounds upon himself
by banging his head against the window and door of the patrol car.
Smith sues Able and Able's city employer alleging a violation of his civil
rights. Prior to these allegations, Officer Able's record is spotless. Smith seeks
to discover Able's personnel file and an internal affairs investigative report
concerning the incident. The city invokes the self-critical analysis privilege in
an attempt to protect both documents from discovery.
1. PersonnelFile
Like Smith, plaintiffs in suits against law enforcement agencies often seek
discovery of officers' personnel files. 224 A personnel file contains personal
information, job history, performance evaluations, commendations, and a
disciplinary record. 225 A personnel file containing negative evaluations or
reprimands may assist a plaintiff in proving that a department was negligent in
retaining a certain officer or for failing to remedy certain behavior.22
In this instance, the department cannot argue that disclosure will directly
chill the department's collection of personnel data. No law enforcement agency
will stop compiling personnel files simply because they may be discoverable in
a civil suit.2 27 The managerial costs in effective retention and promotion are
simply too high.22 8
The better argument lies in the indirect chilling effect disclosure may have
upon the quality of the information collected.2 29 Fellow officers may be less
critical in their evaluations if their opinions may be used against the
department.2 3 ° Collecting frank and thorough evaluations is critical to a
department's ability to promote and retain the best officers. 3 '
224. See, e.g., Solo, 162 F.R.D. at 614 (involving plaintiff seeking personnel files of three
officers in claim brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1983).
225. See WESTON & FRALEY, supra note 151, at 102-06 (outlining requirements for

"comprehensive personnel information system").
226. See Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
("Information contained in these [personnel] files may be relevant on the issues of credibility,
notice to the employer, ratification by the employer and motive of the officers.").
227. See Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (recognizing
"that police department self-evaluation and remedial action do serve an important public policy,
but such policy will not be hindered by the disclosure ordered here").
228. See generally WEsTON & FRALEY, supra note 151, ch. 7. (detailing importance of
personnel information systems).
229. See supra Part IV.A.l.b (discussing indirect chilling effect disclosure has on law
enforcement agency's ability to gather information).
230. See Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (stating that officers'
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Limiting disclosure of the personnel file to only the factual material, such
as the number of complaints filed against an officer, eliminates this indirect
chilling effect. 23 2

Officers are free to provide their subjective analysis

regarding Officer Able's performance, both overall and in regard to specific
instances, without fear of harm to the department. In addition, allowing
disclosure of only the facts protects the officers' privacy rights.233 Finally,
disclosure of the facts recognizes the important policies in favor of disclosure
to
2 34
the plaintiff without compromising an agency's ability to police itself.
The plaintiff has no great need for the subjective component of the
personnel file. If the file contains numerous allegations of misconduct against
Officer Able, those facts may be relevant to what occurred in the cruiser. 235 On
the given facts, Officer Able's record is clean and his personnel file would not
be of assistance to the plaintiff's claim.236 If the department's only concern was
winning this case, and not the overall effectiveness of its evaluative methods,
the department might disclose the file. This scenario-possible disclosure of
the file when information is beneficial and assertion of the privilege is

"knowledge that some of the confidential information recorded might be later exposed to outside
parties would have a certain and chilling effect upon the internal use of such record making").
231. See WESTON & FRALEY, supra note 151, at 101 (stating that with effective, reliable
personnel information "personnel managers and line commanders can make better decisions
concerning transfers and assignments, advancements and promotions, and can better plan career
development programs").
232. See Elliott v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 296-99 (D. Idaho 1983) (limiting disclosure of
personnel records to factual data based on contention that forced disclosure "would deter full
cooperation").
233. See supra Part IV.A.I.b (discussing indirect chilling effect disclosure of private
information may have on agency's ability to acquire information).
234. See Boyd v. Gullett, 64 F.R.D. 169, 178 (D. Md. 1974) (limiting disclosure of police
files to factual information after noting that disclosure furthers "two major federal policies, i.e.,
the vigorous enforcement of the civil rights statutes and the broadest possible scope ofdiscovery
in civil litigation").
235. See Scouler v. Craig, 116 F.R.D. 494, 496 (D.N.J. 1987) (stating that "there can be no
question of the relevancy of these materials [personnel files] to the allegations of the
complaint").
236. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653,672 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that after
in camera review of police files "there is some reason to believe that after seeing this material
plaintiff might decide against expending the time and expense of deposing the parties
involved .... [T]here is some possibility that access to these documents might help persuade
plaintiff to seek an early settlement.").
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harmful-is an example of one unfairness aspect underlying the privilege. 2"
But, the department has concerns beyond simply winning the case. 238
2. InternalAffairs Investigative Report
The analysis regarding the internal affairs report parallels that of the
personnel file in numerous respects. The direct chilling effect is minimal

because investigation of alleged abuses through an internal affairs division is
too important to be forgone by a police department. 239 Again, the chilling
effect materializes in the agency's ability to get in-depth and accurate
information from its officers.24 °
The fact/opinion distinction might alleviate the potential for indirect
chill.2 4' But, in the context of an internal affairs investigation, the line drawing
between fact and opinion becomes more difficult. 242 The report contains an
investigative officer's impression of what occurred in the cruiser. Determining
whether these conclusions are recitation of fact, pure speculation, or
assumptions drawn from the facts is an arduous process. 243 A court might
attempt to draw the distinction itself through an in camera review of the
report, 2 " though some courts are reluctant to bog themselves down in detailed
237. See Vandegrift, supra note 84, at 183 (stating that allowing parties to use favorable
reports but protecting unfavorable ones from discovery is unfair and "cuts against application of
the privilege").
238. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (noting that discovery dispute
"transcends the situation confronting this petitioner" and that problem must be viewed "in light
of the limitless situations where the particular kind of discovery ... might be used").
239. See Skibo v. City ofNew York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting request
for production of internal affairs documents and stating that "[t]he police department needs to
continue to monitor itself to ensure that department procedures are effective and that officers are
complying with these procedures").
240. See Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45, 46 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (granting petition for
protective order by police chief on grounds that disclosure of internal affairs report would
"impair his ability to obtain the internal reporting necessary to provide for an efficient police
force").
241. See Elliott v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 296-97 (D. Idaho 1983) (limiting disclosure of
internal investigations to factual data based on contention that forced disclosure "would deter
full cooperation").
242. See Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting
that memorandum containing summary of internal investigation "necessarily involves some
characterizations, and the evaluative and factual portions are not segregable").
243. See Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413, 418 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (noting that "both
factual data ... and evaluations of the Task Force are intertwined within the Report").
244. See Elliott, 98 F.R.D. at 297 ("If the defendants believe that portions of the internal
investigation reports contain evaluative summaries or recommendations that should not be
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analysis of discovery materials.245 Clearly labeling the sections of the reports as
either facts or subjective analysis would aid an agency's assertion of the
privilege.246
Another difference between the discoverability of the personnel file and
that of the internal affairs report lies in the plaintiff's need for the latter. The
results of the internal affairs report are much more likely to be relevant to the
2 47

plaintiff's case because they concern the specific act of alleged brutality.
Without discovering the report, the plaintiff must rely solely on his own
testimony, affected by his drug-addled state at the time of the arrest, to rebut

Officer Able's description of the arrest.248 The court also must consider the
strength of the plaintiff's case at this point. 249 The plaintiff was intoxicated.
Private citizens assert that Officer Able handled himself professionally during
the arrest. Officer Able's record contains no hint of ill will toward the plaintiff.
Ordering disclosure of the report, with the accompanying chilling effects of
disclosure, in order to assist a plaintiff with a weak case on a fishing expedition
does not serve the interest of society or justice.25
B. Example Two-Arrestee Dies After Being Hogtied by Officers
Jane Brown is arrested by multiple officers.25' She violently resists arrest.
After handcuffing her hands behind her back and her feet together, officers use
a "hogtie" to connect the two restraints for both their and the arrestee's safety.
discovered, the reports may be submitted to the court for in camera inspection.").
245. See Hampton v.City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227,229 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to
"comb through seven personnel files and seven internal affairs histories" and placing burden on
"attorneys to make a good faith effort to resolve as much of this type of [discovery] dispute as
possible").
246. See Burke, 115 F.R.D. at 232 ("The balance of the document consists of 'Findings'
and a 'Recommendation.' This discussion could be characterized, at least in part, as evaluative,
but the five paragraphs appearing on the second page below the word 'Findings' are, in essence,
factual.").
247. See Skibo v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58,64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting plaintiff's
"overwhelming need" for results of internal affairs documents).
248. See Bergman, 97 F.R.D. at 418 ("[A] specific need for this evidence isapparent where
all the information ...is in the hands of the party Defendant.").
249. See supra Part IV.A.5 (discussing frivolous claims).
250. See Cruzv. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 91-1547,1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 187, at *7(4th
Cir. Jan. 7, 1993) (noting that plaintiff "requested a vast amount of highly sensitive material
with little or no notion of what he might find" and upholding order limiting disclosure to factual
aspects of report).
251. This fact pattern is loosely based on Price v.County ofSan Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614
(S.D. Cal. 1996), in which an arrestee died after being hogtied by officers.
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During the process, Brown's face is injured by contact with the pavement and
begins to bleed heavily. The officers call for paramedics upon seeing the
blood. When the paramedics arrive, they discover that Brown is having
difficulty breathing and soon stops breathing. The paramedics have the officers
release the restraints and immediately begin CPR. They are unable to revive
Brown and she dies on the way to the hospital.
Brown's estate sues the officers and their city employer for violating her
civil rights. The suit alleges that the police department had a custom and
practice of using the hogtie position for restraint despite being aware of
possible danger of suffocation to arrestees. The plaintiff seeks discovery of a
study conducted by the department regarding the effectiveness and safety of the
hogtie restraint conducted approximately two years prior to the accident. The
city asserts the self-critical analysis privilege to protect the report.
In the case on which this example is based, the district court rejected
assertion of the privilege.252 The district court noted binding Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals precedent denying protection of "routine internal corporate
reviews of matters related to safety concerns. 2 53 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that postaccident investigations may be privileged but that "it is
perverse to assume that the candid assessments necessary to prevent accidents
will be inhibited by the fear that they could later be used as a weapon in
254
hypothetical litigation they are supposed to prevent.1
Protecting only postaccident evaluations ensures that law enforcement
agencies remain
one step behind the causes of accidents in their evaluative
processes. 55 Limiting the privilege to instances in which the damage is already
255
done hamstrings an agency's ability to prevent future accidents.Y Courts
252. See Price, 165 F.R.D. at 619 ("[T]he claim of self-critical analysis privilege as to all

of the documents submitted by the Defendants for in camera review is hereby rejected.").
253. See id. at 618 (quoting Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423,426 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
254. Dowling, 971 F.2d at 427.
255. See Richard L. Kaiser, The Self-CriticalAnalysis Privilegefor Products Liability:
What Is It, and How Can It Be Achieved in Wisconsin?, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 119, 130 ("Many

would argue that the market will dictate the company's actions, regardless of the existence or
non-existence of the privilege. Ifconsumers aregetting hurt, they will sue and stop buying the
product, forcing the company to perform safety reviews leading to improved product safety."
(emphasis added)). Denying protection to pre-accident reviews leads to organizations
implementing change only after individuals are harmed.
256. See Ellen Page DelSole, An Environmental Audit Privilege: What Protection
Remains After EPA's Rejection of the Privilege?,46 CATH. U. L. REv. 325,361 (1997) (stating

that an "argument could still be made... that privilege should extend to prospective
investigation if the company shows during in camera review that adequate efforts were made
promptly to correct any noncompliance discovered").
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utilizing the self-critical analysis privilege should recognize that prevention of
future accidents through confidential self-evaluation works in the interest of
society. s7
Even given the Ninth Circuit's holding, the district court erred in
analyzing the study as a "routine internal corporate review." 2" The study is not
a routine review of safety matters. Instead, the study is a unique self-analysis of
a specific procedure. Denying protection of this study while inferring that an
"investigation of a particular event of hogtying" would be protected 25 9 ignores
the privilege's goal of promoting socially beneficial self-improvement. 2 6°
After recognizing the underlying policies of the privilege, a court should
find that the department demonstrates a direct chilling effect on disclosure. 6'
Unlike Example One, in this scenario the police department has a legitimate
argument regarding the direct chilling effect that disclosure would have on the
department's willingness to conduct internal evaluations. The study conducted
was not an ordinary or routine evaluation of officers or their conduct. 62
Instead, the evaluation concerned an overall consideration of a specific method
of restraint.2 63 The agency conducted a thorough critique of this procedure in
order to determine its safety and effectiveness, 264 precisely the type of selfevaluation that the self-critical analysis privilege fosters. 65
257. See id. (noting that "[t]he policy reasons for such a position [protecting pre-accident
reviews] are evidenced by the inclusion of similar provisions inmany of the state environmental
audit privilege statutes," which as noted earlier is situation-specific application of the selfcritical analysis privilege); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting environmental
audit privilege).
258. Price v.County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
259. See id. (noting that "none of the documents are in the nature of investigation of a
particular event of hogtying").
260. See Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F.Supp 1057, 1061 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (analyzing
Bredice and subsequent cases as protecting evaluations whose "purpose was... to formulate or
review... policies in general," not evaluation of "one specific incident").
261. See supra Part IV.A.l.a (discussing direct chilling effect on law enforcement
agencies).
262. See Price, 165 F.R.D. at 619 (noting that "the documents reflect a process by the
County, following the City of San Diego's Task Force Report on Custody Deaths, to address
possible suffocation resulting from arrestees being hogtied"). The court found the report to be a
routine review but never explained its reasoning when clearly this type of report was not
routinely conducted. See id. (finding report routine).
263. See id. (explaining that report concerned hogtying).
264. See id. (examining report).
265. See Self-CriticalAnalysis, supranote 27, at 1088 (noting that courts recognizing law
enforcement agencies' assertion of self-critical analysis privilege have done so due to "the
public interest inpermitting police departments to conduct thorough investigations to reduce the
number of improper police actions").
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Limiting disclosure to the facts might alleviate some of this chilling
effect.2 66 But, another factor in the balancing inherent in the privilege favors
disclosure because the plaintiff's claim clearly is not frivolous. 267 While there
may be concerns regarding unfairness to the agency,2 68 disclosure raises only
minimal privacy concerns.2 69 Given the strong showing of the direct chilling
effect, analysis of these factors favors protection of the study from disclosure.27 °

As for the factors favoring disclosure, the plaintiff has a compelling
argument for discovery. Both Congress and the federal courts favor a
plaintiff's right to broad discovery.2 7' The public's interest in vindicating an
arrestee's death is high.272 The strongest factor in favor of discovery is the
plaintiff's need for this evidence.273 A study in which the department sanctions
the use of hogties is custom-made for the plaintiff's case. The study establishes
the department's awareness of the dangers and is "directly relevant to showing
a deliberate indifference. 274
Whether or not a court orders disclosure requires two decisions. First, a
court must consider whether society is best served by plaintiffs enforcing their
individual rights through broad discovery, and thus furthering society's rights
as a whole, or if society is better served by departments freely engaging in selfcritical analysis. 27 5 Second, assuming a court recognizes the socially beneficial

aspects of self-evaluation, this benefit must be weighed against the burden
protection places on individual plaintiffs.

76

In this case, a court could

266. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing fact/opinion distinction).
267. See supra Part IV.A.5 (discussing consideration that strength of plaintiff's claim
should play in court's requisite balancing of interests).
268. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing unfairness inherent in requiring disclosure of
internal evaluations).
269. See supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing privacy concerns raised by disclosure).
270. See supra Part IV.A (discussing factors favoring protection of self-evaluations
conducted by law enforcement agencies).
271. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing plaintiffs presumptive right to broad discovery).
272. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 507-08 ("[T]he special public interest in § 1983
litigation is a highly important factor in favor of disclosure.").
273. See Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting
that "[t]he key consideration is the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff's case"
especially when considering "issue of municipal liability under section 1983" (internal citations
and punctuation omitted)).
274. Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
275. See Manns v. Smith, 181 F.R.D. 329, 330 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (remanding discovery
order due to failure of magistrate to consider competing factors).
276. See Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D. 23, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(balancing "the public interest in insuring the confidentiality of the District Attorney's files"
against "the defendants' need for the information").
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recognize the importance of both sides by protecting the evaluative aspects of
the report but providing access to the raw data.277
VI. Conclusion

Application of the self-critical analysis privilege in the law enforcement
context remains a troublesome and uncertain prospect. Courts facing assertion
of the privilege must evaluate the effectiveness of self-evaluations functioning
as internal checking mechanisms as well as the external checking inherent in
lawsuits. Courts should recognize assertion of the privilege by law
enforcement agencies in situations in which disclosure hampers the ability of
the agency to effectively gather reliable information in order to implement
socially beneficial change.

277. SeeBoydv. Gullett, 64F.R.D. 169, 178(D. Md. 1974) ("Although the latter materials
[of a nonfactual nature] could well be relevant to the plaintiffs' case, some supervision of
discovery may be necessary to protect the decision making process in the various government
agencies involved in this case.").

